Post-Ipp special limitation periods for cases of injury to a child by a parent or close associate: New jurisdictional gulfs
Dr Ben Mathews*
The Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence made several recommendations concerning time limitation periods within which civil claims may be instituted. Among these was a recommendation for a special limitation period for cases where a child is injured by a parent or a person in a close relationship with the childâ€™s parent, recognising the unfairness of a standard limitation period for these cases. New South Wales and Victoria have enacted legislative changes pursuant to this recommendation, giving much more time to commence litigation where a child is injured by a parent or a parentâ€™s â€˜close associateâ€™. These provisions provide particular relief to plaintiffs in many cases of child abuse. This article examines these provisions and their rationales, and explores how they will operate. It will be argued that other jurisdictions should follow the lead of New South Wales and Victoria to eliminate unjustifiable jurisdictional differences in access to justice.
1. Limitation periods and minority
In all States and Territories of Australia, except Western Australia, actions for damages for personal injuries must generally be commenced within three years from when the cause of action arose. In Western Australia, a plaintiff has four years to commence litigation for damages in trespass to the person, assault and battery, and six years if proceeding in negligence. In New South Wales and Victoria, actions brought concerning injury sustained after recent amendments in the wake of the Ipp Report have time running from the date of discoverability rather than from when the cause of action arose. The date of discoverability is the date when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the injury, the defendant having caused that injury, and the fact that the injury is of sufficient seriousness to justify bringing an action.
1.1 Suspension of limitation period during minority
In jurisdictions other than New South Wales and Victoria, children are exempted, because of their lack of legal capacity, from the expectation that they will bring an action within the limited time; where a child suffers personal injury the time period is suspended until the child attains legal majority. There is a significant restriction on this exemption in Tasmania. There, the suspension of time does not operate in cases of personal injury to a child through negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, if the child was in the custody of a parent. In most Australian jurisdictions, therefore, a survivor of child abuse has until turning 21 to institute proceedings. For reasons discussed shortly, even this time period is impossible for many survivors of child abuse to meet, so many plaintiffs in this class of case who are faced with a defendant who is unwilling to settle the claim are forced to apply to the court for an extension of time or to abandon the action.
1.2 Abolition of suspension during minority: New South Wales and Victoria
However, the suspension of the three-year period so that it runs from majority now no longer applies in New South Wales and Victoria. Where a child suffers injury caused by someone who is not a parent or a close associate of a parent, amendments motivated by the Ipp Report abolish this position. Instead, provided that a child is in the custody of a capable parent or guardian, the child is deemed not to be under a legal disability or incapacity, and the childâ€™s parent or guardian is required to bring the action on the childâ€™s behalf within a set period of time, which may often be a much shorter period than would exist in other Australian jurisdictions. Discoverability in these cases is sheeted home to the childâ€™s parent or guardian. In New South Wales, the action is primarily treated indifferently from any other and so must be brought within three years from when the action is discoverable. In Victoria, the action is accorded some distinction from those simply involving adults and must be brought within six years from when the action is discoverable. In both cases, a longstop of 12 years from the date of the wrongful acts applies, which is meant to work as an ultimate bar.
The abolition of the traditional suspension of the running of time during minority promotes recommendations made by the Ipp Report. The[hl1] motive behind this development is to finalise legal proceedings as quickly as possible from the date of discoverability. This promotes the object of streamlining the civil litigation system to decrease public cost and to guard against insurance premium inflation. Some protection is offered to an adult survivor of injury sustained as a child in the event of a parent not instituting proceedings within time. In particular, the New South Wales legislation has an extension provision devoted to cases where there has been an irrational failure by a parent to bring an action for a minor, but this may only be of use in limited circumstances. Victoria lacks a comparable provision but still has a general extension provision that could be used by plaintiffs in this circumstance.
2. Ipp Report
These developments exemplify the purpose of the Ipp Report, which had terms of reference to examine methods to reform the common law to limit liability and quantum of damages in civil proceedings. Within this brief, the Review Panel was required to develop and evaluate options for a uniform limitation period of three years for all persons. Given these terms of reference, and in light of the recommendations made to achieve those objects, the recommendations made by the Ipp Report about cases of injury to a child inflicted by a parent or close associate of a parent arguably constitute an even stronger endorsement than could otherwise be made by a sympathetic advocate of the reasons for enacting special provisions for certain classes of case.
The Ipp Report recognised the unjustifiable difficulties posed by a standard limitation period in cases where a child is injured by a parent or a close associate of a parent. It recommended that a special limitation period be enacted to provide a justifiable period for plaintiffs to institute proceedings in these cases. The reasons for this recommendation were not thoroughly clarified, although there is a brief explicit reference to the â€˜delayed psychological effect of sexual or other physical abuseâ€™ as an example of a type of damage which must be considered when framing limitation provisions, and more significantly there is an express statement that the recommended strategy would â€˜give plaintiffs a reasonable time to be free of the influence of the parent, guardian or potential defendant (as the case may be) before having to commence proceedings.â€™ Although the Ipp Report did not fully explore the reasons for such a recommendation, there is an emerging body of literature â€“ judicial and academic - that does detail the arguments for a limitation period in cases of child abuse that is longer than the standard time period. In addition, a number of jurisdictions elsewhere have abolished or amended limitation periods for these cases.
2.1 Qualitative differences in child abuse cases
In sum, the argument proceeds from the recognition that there are qualitative differences in child abuse cases which distinguish them from other personal injuries cases, which make the generally sound policy reasons informing a standard limitation period less applicable. The policy reasons are that defendants have a right to a fair trial and need to be able to defend themselves with relatively fresh evidence, people should be able to proceed with their lives unencumbered by the threat of long-delayed claims, plaintiffs should not sleep on their rights, and the public has an interest in the prompt settlement of disputes. The references in the Ipp Report to the latent psychological injuries typically occurring in cases of child sexual and physical abuse, and to the influence commonly exerted over the victim by the wrongdoer, which deters the institution of legal proceedings, are two of the most significant qualitative differences in these classes of case.
The qualitative differences in child abuse cases as opposed to other personal injury cases flow from the nature of the acts and injuries involved. The differences discussed here apply in particular to cases of child sexual abuse, but, as the Ipp Report observed, they are also amenable to at least some cases of child physical abuse. The loss of evidence argument is affected by the facts that typically the acts occur in private and so are rarely accompanied by objective evidence, and the acts are often kept secret. The sleeping on rights argument is undermined by the fact that the injury is inflicted on a child, who is incapable of bringing proceedings independently. In addition to this, a typical plaintiff in this class of case will not know of the nature and extent of his or her injury, or its cause, until long after attaining majority. This knowledge typically only arises from psychiatric diagnosis. Even when this knowledge is obtained, many survivors will still not feel capable of instituting legal proceedings. Survivors of child abuse often have a misplaced sense of guilt, shame and responsibility for the acts which impedes their realisation of being the victim of a wrong. These misplaced feelings are factors contributing to some survivorsâ€™ inability to ever disclose the events, and, where the survivor is able to eventually disclose, in the amount of time taken to do so. As well, in cases of familial abuse, the wrongdoerâ€™s position of superiority can work as an even more potent psychological deterrent from proceeding. The public interest argument in this context actually should work in favour of a long limitation period because the acts are particularly egregious, and because a significant number of perpetrators are likely to commit the acts against other individuals. The heinous nature of the acts also works against the principle that people should not live with the threat of delayed claims.
The Ipp Report recommended that where a child is injured by a parent, guardian or a person in a close relationship with the parent or guardian, the limitation period should only start to run when the plaintiff turns 25. In such cases, the limitation period should be three years. A person would be in a â€˜close relationshipâ€™ with the childâ€™s parent or guardian if the parent or guardian might be influenced by the potential defendant not to bring a claim on behalf of the child; or if the minor might be unwilling to disclose to the parent or guardian the nature of the actions that allegedly caused the damage. Since in some of these cases the date of discoverability may not occur until after expiry of this period, the court should have discretion at any time to extend the limitation period to the expiry of a period of three years from the date of discoverability.
3. Legislative changes in New South Wales and Victoria
Responding to the Ipp Report, legislatures in New South Wales and Victoria enacted a special limitation period for cases where a child is injured by a parent or a close associate of a parent. Although similar, the changes made are not identical to those envisaged by the Ipp Report. The changes apply to injuries sustained after commencement of the relevant provisions.
In New South Wales, s 50E creates a special limitation period for minors injured by close â€˜relativesâ€™, which is a somewhat misleading term. The comparable Victorian provision, s 27I, is entitled â€˜Special limitation period for minors injured by close relatives or close associatesâ€™, and this description seems more accurate. Apart from this difference, and some apparently inconsequential variations in wording, the two provisions are identical.
The provisions state that in these cases, the action is discoverable by the victim when he or she turns 25 years of age, or when the cause of action is actually discoverable, whichever is later. The longstop period of 12 years runs from when the victim turns 25, hence ending when the victim turns 37. The stipulation of actual discoverability is significant because it rules out any possibility of an argument by a defendant based on constructive discoverability; that is, an argument that a plaintiffâ€™s time period started to run from when it could be argued that the plaintiff ought to have known of the three discoverability factors. Such arguments about what a survivor of child abuse ought to have known, and when that person ought to have known particular facts related to discoverability and hence ought to have instituted proceedings, have been successfully used by defendants to defeat applications for extensions of time. If the time period here ran from discoverability whether actual or constructive, rather than running only from actual discoverability, much of the benefit of the special limitation period could be lost.
This means that in this class of case, a plaintiff who has turned 25 has three years to institute proceedings once he or she has actual knowledge of the facts of the injury, of the defendant causing that injury, and of the injury being of sufficient seriousness that it justifies legal action. Effectively then, a plaintiff here can have until turning 37 to institute proceedings. On the basis of the passage of time, a plaintiff could only be prevented from bringing an action within this 12 year period if it can be shown by a defendant that a plaintiff had actual knowledge of the three discoverability factors at a date more than three years before the plaintiff actually instituted proceedings. This is a significant widening of time for plaintiffs in this context.
3.1 The close associate provision
Apart from the subset of cases that arise from injury caused by a parent or guardian, a large part of the ambit of the provision will turn on the interpretation of the definition of â€˜close associateâ€™. A â€˜close associateâ€™ of a parent or guardian of the victim is defined as:
a person whose relationship with the parent or guardian is such that:
(a) the parent or guardian might be influenced by the person not to bring an action on behalf of the victim; or
(b) the victim might be unwilling to disclose to the parent or guardian the act resulting in the injury.
Parliamentary debates in New South Wales indicate that the primary function of the special time limitation provision is to create an â€˜important exceptionâ€™ for cases of child abuse. The definition of close associate appears to represent two justifications for extending the special time period beyond wrongdoing parents and guardians alone. The first limb embodies the possibility that the wrongdoerâ€™s identity can dissuade a childâ€™s parent from bringing an action on behalf of the child against the wrongdoer, even if the parent possesses knowledge of the events, the childâ€™s injury, and the seriousness of the childâ€™s injuries.
The second limb appears to embody the situation where because of the wrongdoerâ€™s identity, the child might be dissuaded from disclosing the events. If conceptually limited to this identity-related rationale, as suggested by the Ipp Reportâ€™s reference to the rationale for the provision being to give a plaintiff time to be free of the wrongdoerâ€™s influence, the second limb may be too narrow since a major reason for a child not disclosing sexual abuse is not simply the identity of the abuser, but the nature of the acts and the nature of any feelings about those acts the child may either have by himself or herself, or which have been imposed on the child.
However, the breadth of coverage in practice of the close associate concept remains to be seen. One matter determining the extent of its use is the raw number of cases of child sexual abuse. This will be discussed in Part 4.1 of this article, but at this point it is useful to observe that the number of cases may well be more than the â€˜very few casesâ€™ anticipated in Parliamentary debates. Another factor relevant to the use of the close associate provision depends on the scope of its construction. Will the close associate provision be capable of including wrongdoers such as priests, teachers, scoutmasters, de facto partners of the childâ€™s mother, grandparents, and sports coaches? In both limbs of the definition, the phrase â€˜might beâ€™ suggests a broad ambit, being conceptually more inclusive than descriptors such as â€˜isâ€™. Moreover, since this special limitation period is a remedial provision, it should be interpreted beneficially in the event of any ambiguity. Therefore, in the context of the second limb, it seems reasonable to argue that in cases where a child is unwilling to disclose the abuse because of the wrongdoerâ€™s identity and relationship with the childâ€™s parent, or because of an unwillingness to disclose the abuse for some reason connected with the nature of the acts and the nature of any feelings produced by those acts, the victim should receive the benefit of the close associate special provision. If construed only by reference to the identity of the wrongdoer, and if this construction negates the operation of the provision in cases where the child feels unwilling to disclose the acts because of the nature of them rather than because the child perceives a close relationship between the wrongdoer and his or her parent, the close associate provision could be framed too narrowly. It is useful to explore the operation of the provision in two circumstances to ascertain its ambit and outcome, and to compare this with other jurisdictions.
3.2 Operation of special limitation period: child injured by a parent or close associate
Purely from the perspective of gaining access to civil courts, the optimum situation in New South Wales and Victoria for a survivor of child abuse is if the wrongdoer was a parent or â€˜close associateâ€™ of a parent. Suppose that a plaintiff, referred to here as â€˜Xâ€™, is 10 years old when his father sexually abuses him. Since X was a minor at the time of the act, and since the cause of action is against Xâ€™s parent, then the action is discoverable when X turns 25, or when it is actually discoverable, whichever is later, and the 12 year longstop runs from when X turns 25. The cause of action will be actually discoverable when X actually knows that the injury has occurred; the injury was caused by the defendant; and the injury was sufficiently serious to justify bringing an action. Time will expire for X three years after X actually knows these three facts, provided he has turned 25. Since the 12 year longstop runs from when X turns 25, it will end when he turns 37. This means that X potentially has until he turns 37 to bring the action.
If X knows the three factors when he turns 24, then the action is still deemed not discoverable until he is 25 so he will still have until he turns 28 to bring the action. If X knows the three factors when he turns 28, then he has until he turns 31 to commence proceedings. If X knows the three factors when he turns 34, 35 or 36, then he has until he turns 37 because of the longstop.
If X does not know the three factors by the time he turns 37, time will have run out. His option to attempt to enliven the claim then is to apply under s 62A for an extension of the longstop. Under that provision, the court may, if it decides it is just and reasonable to do so, extend the longstop for whatever period it determines, provided that the extension will not extend the limitation period beyond three years from when the action was discoverable by the plaintiff. In deciding whether to extend the longstop, under s 62B(1) the court must consider all the circumstances of the case, and must consider the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the defendant through loss of evidence, the nature and extent of the plaintiffâ€™s injury, anything the defendant did to induce the plaintiffâ€™s delay in proceeding, the steps taken by the plaintiff to obtain expert advice and the nature of any such advice received, and the time when the action was discoverable by the plaintiff.
If X resides in Victoria, this entire scenario will work the same way. As well, the situation if the longstop expires will also be similar, with the extension provision in Victoria, s 27K, being essentially the same as s 62A. In Victoria, the factors that the court must consider on an application for an extension of time are set out in s 27L, and these too are largely the same as the New South Wales counterparts. However, s 27L(1)(f) creates one clear difference, with the court being directed to consider â€˜the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonablyâ€™ once the plaintiff knew that the act of the defendant â€˜might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damagesâ€™. This subsection could form the focus of many defence arguments against the granting of an extension. Depending on interpretation and application of this provision, this may make the situation more difficult in Victoria than New South Wales, if courts were to have demanding expectations about the promptness and reasonableness of plaintiffsâ€™ actions once they know an act â€˜mightâ€™ be capable of giving rise to an action for damages.
Access to the courts is therefore much changed for plaintiffs in child abuse cases in these two jurisdictions, at least where the wrongdoer is a parent or falls within the close associate definition. The adult survivor of child abuse will at a minimum have until he or she turns 28 to institute proceedings, and, arguably, in many cases will effectively have until 37. These citizens therefore will have much more time than do their counterparts elsewhere in Australia (apart from Western Australia), who under current provisions have until turning 21 to institute proceedings. If X lived in these jurisdictions and did not commence proceedings by the time he turned 21, he would have to rely on a successful application for an extension of time. Extensions of time are technically available in most jurisdictions where a plaintiff discovers decisive material facts relevant to the action after expiry of time, but gaining an extension in child abuse cases is frequently difficult, particularly if a long period of time has elapsed from the date of the events. A clear example of this difference is that in the Queensland case of Hopkins, the applicant alleged sexual abuse by her foster father but could not bring her case within time and made an application for an extension aged 28, which was refused. If the plaintiff in Hopkins was governed by these new provisions, she would have been entitled as of right to bring the claim. The contrast between New South Wales and Victoria on one hand, and Western Australia and Tasmania on the other, is even more marked, because there is no extension provision in Western Australia, and only a limited provision in Tasmania.
The operation of the special limitation period is fairly clear when the wrongdoer is a parent. However, the question of whether a wrongdoer is a close associate is not as concrete. Because of the consequences for litigants flowing from whether the wrongdoer is classed as a close associate or not, there may be some disputes about whether a particular wrongdoer falls within the definition or remains outside it.
3.3 Operation of special limitation period: child injured by a wrongdoer who is not a parent or close associate
Suppose that on the date that another plaintiff, referred to here as â€˜Yâ€™, turns 10, her motherâ€™s boyfriend (â€˜Zâ€™) sexually abuses her. She tells her mother about the abuse and she has indicators of it, such as being upset, anxious, and not wanting to be left alone with Z. The time limit depends on whether Yâ€™s motherâ€™s boyfriend falls within the definition of a close associate. If the motherâ€™s boyfriend is a close associate, then the special time period will apply and the outcomes of Xâ€™s situation will be duplicated, giving Y effectively until 37 to bring her claim. If not, the outcome is much different.
3.3.1 Characterizing a wrongdoer as a close associate
Depending on the facts of each case, when applying each limb of the definition the motherâ€™s boyfriend Z may or may not be classed as a close associate. The provision regarding the definition of close associate seems to turn on the identity of the wrongdoer and its effect on the parentâ€™s willingness to bring proceedings (the first limb); and in the second limb, the effect of the wrongdoerâ€™s identity on the victimâ€™s willingness to disclose the events, rather than the effect of the nature of the acts on this willingness to disclose.
Addressing the first limb, and assuming for this purpose that Y has told her mother about the abuse, if Yâ€™s mother is in love with Z and harbours strong hopes about the continuation and development of their relationship, or if for some other reason her behaviour is strongly influenced by Z, he will be a close associate if this means that Yâ€™s mother â€˜might beâ€™ influenced by Z not to bring an action on Yâ€™s behalf. Equally, even if these circumstances exist, they might not actually dissuade Yâ€™s mother from bringing an action, and if this is the case then counsel for Z would argue that he is not a close associate. Alternatively, suppose that Yâ€™s mother had not known Z for long and the relationship was not serious. In this case, if Z had no capacity to directly influence Yâ€™s mother about whether or not to take legal action, then Z would not be a close associate under the first limb.
Even so, under the second limb of the definition, Z in any of these circumstances may be classed as a close associate if Y feels unwilling to disclose the events. If Y was unwilling to disclose because of her perception of Zâ€™s relationship with her mother, then Z should be classed as a close associate. However, depending on interpretation of the provision, if Y feels unwilling to disclose not because of Zâ€™s identity or his relationship with her mother, but because of the nature of the acts and her feelings about them, on a very narrow interpretation this may result in Z not being classed as a close associate. It is submitted that this interpretation is unjustifiable when compared with the purpose of the provision.
It is clearly advantageous for a plaintiff to successfully argue that the wrongdoer was a close associate, since the effect is to suspend time until turning 25 and possessing actual discoverability, and this can operate to mean that the victim effectively has until 37 to institute proceedings. The alternative â€“ if the wrongdoer is not a close associate â€“ is that time runs from the victimâ€™s parentâ€™s discoverability, whether actual or constructive, and even if the action is not discoverable (for example, through non-disclosure and no other circumstance creating knowledge on the parentâ€™s part) then time will expire on the date 12 years after the events. This different outcome will be replicated if instead of the wrongdoer in the hypothetical scenario being Yâ€™s motherâ€™s boyfriend, it is Yâ€™s parish priest, maths teacher, swimming coach or friendâ€™s father who is deemed not to be a close associate. Because of these contrasts in the running of time, it is anticipated that defendants will argue for a narrow interpretation of who constitutes a close associate in cases such as the example outlined above, and plaintiffs will argue for a broader construction.
If the wrongdoer is not found to be a close associate, then since Y is in the custody of a capable parent, she is deemed not to be under a disability. Because she is not under a disability, the limitation period is not suspended and in New South Wales the standard time period will apply. This means that the action must be brought within three years of discoverability, or within 12 years of the event, whichever is first to expire. The situation in Victoria is identical except instead of three years post-discoverability, the parent will have six years post-discoverability.
The question then becomes: when was Yâ€™s action discoverable? In determining this, the facts that are known or ought to be known by Yâ€™s capable parent are taken to be the facts known or which ought to be known by Y. This means that if the parent knows of the injury, of the defendant causing it, and of the sufficient seriousness of the injury, then the action must be brought within three years of the possession of this knowledge. This also means that if it is deemed that the parent ought to have known of the three facts by a certain date, then the action must be brought within three years of that date (or six in Victoria). It will be deemed that Yâ€™s mother ought to have known a fact at a particular time if the fact would have been ascertained by her if she had taken all reasonable steps by that time to ascertain the fact.
3.3.2 If the action is actually discoverable
If the parent actually knows the three facts, then the parent must bring the action within three years of the date on which that actual knowledge exists (or six in Victoria). Therefore, if the child tells the parent about the abuse and the parent investigates and ascertains that the child was injured due to the defendantâ€™s fault and the injury is sufficiently serious to justify proceeding, then the three-year period operates from the date of that knowledge (or six in Victoria). In this example, if Y disclosed the abuse to her mother immediately then an action would have to be brought by Yâ€™s mother on Yâ€™s behalf within three years (or six in Victoria): that is, by the time Y turned 13, or if in Victoria, 16. This is a much narrower time period than would occur in other Australian jurisdictions.
Similarly, if Y was 7, or 13, or 16 when the abuse occurred and the disclosure was made, and her mother had actual knowledge of the defendantâ€™s abuse and of the fact that the injury was of sufficient seriousness to justify bringing an action, then the action would have to be commenced within three years: that is, by the time the child turned 10, 16 or 19 respectively, or, if in Victoria, by 13, 19 or 22. Again, this is a much tighter time period than exists in other jurisdictions. This places a heavy onus on parents who may know about the act (or some part of it), but who might not appreciate the seriousness of the consequences.
3.3.3 If the action is constructively discoverable
If the parent does not actually know the three facts, the question then may arise: ought the parent to have known the three facts? That is, did the parent have constructive knowledge? This will be a problematic area if, for example, the child does not disclose. Since there could be a large difference between the date time expired based on constructive discoverability, and the date time will expire through application of the longstop, defendants may attempt to demonstrate that the victimâ€™s parent ought to have known the three discoverability factors. For example, if Y began exhibiting a number of overt signs of having been abused â€“ for example, through sexualised play, self-harming, and extreme anxiety â€“ a defendant may argue that this should have put Yâ€™s parent on notice that something had happened to Y sufficient to require the parent to find out what exactly had occurred. If constructive discoverability is argued to have crystallised by the time Y turned 11, for example, then time would expire three years from that date: by the time Y turned 14 (or if in Victoria, 17). In contrast, if in this circumstance it was decided that the action was not discoverable, then the longstop would operate and time would expire 12 years after the event, which is when Y turns 22.
For reasons similar to those that motivate the argument that the close associate provision should not be read too narrowly, it is submitted that an argument about a parentâ€™s constructive discoverability should not be accepted unless there is very clear evidence that the childâ€™s parent ought to have known of the three discoverability factors in a case of child sexual abuse. Child victims frequently do not disclose the abuse, and abused children may exhibit few or only vague signs of abuse that may be explicable on other less sinister grounds. Because of the concealment of the acts and the fact that the consequences may be difficult to link to any obvious causal factor, in many cases there may be no blame that can reasonably be attached to a parent for not knowing what is happening to his or her child, particularly if the child is older. As well as these arguments about a fair interpretation of constructive discoverability based on what is reasonable to require of a parent, there is the effect of such steep expectations to consider. An abused child should not be visited with the consequences of a harsh expectation of what a parent ought to have known and done. Again, because these provisions are remedial, they should be interpreted beneficially.
Alternatively, there may be situations where a strong case for constructive discoverability is made out. If, for example, a child discloses the abuse to the parent and is clearly suffering serious injury from the effects of the abuse but the parent does not believe the child or does not make investigations, without any good reason for such disbelief or inactivity, then such a parent may more justifiably be argued to have had constructive knowledge. A finding of constructive discoverability would activate the three-year period (six in Victoria) in which the parent is expected by the legislation to institute proceedings on behalf of the child. This is the type of situation that the New South Wales provision enabling an extension of time for a parentâ€™s irrational failure to act is intended for. While this provision lacks a Victorian counterpart, it is submitted that in equivalent circumstances in Victoria, an outcome should be reached in a normal extension of time application that would mirror the result if the application were brought in New South Wales.
3.3.4 If the action is not discoverable: application of the longstop
If it is found that the action was not discoverable, then the longstop will apply, ending the time period 12 years after the event. In the example of Y, if she did not disclose the abuse then the action would not be actually discoverable, and assuming the action was also not constructively discoverable, then the longstop would cause time to expire when Y turns 22. By itself, the application of the longstop could produce extremely narrow time limits, and would produce results much different even to the current situation in other Australian jurisdictions. If a child is aged 6 when the injury is inflicted, and if the parent lacks actual or constructive knowledge, the longstop will make the time limit end 12 years from the date of the event, so the longstop will make time expire when the child turns 18.
The only option for a plaintiff in this situation to enliven the action is to apply for an extension of the longstop under s 62A. However, the ultimate bar in New South Wales of 30 years will mean that even this avenue is closed, for Y, by the time she turns 40; and if a child is injured at age 6, by the time that child turns 36. Such results may be unjust, and may produce other jurisdictional differences. There is no similar ultimate bar in the Victorian statute.
It is likely that in many cases that are not discoverable by the parent, the longstop period of 12 years from the date of the act will operate. This will mean that applications for extensions of time will determine some applicantsâ€™ access to courts. In these applications, judicial findings about what is just and reasonable will be decisive, and these findings may often depend on the courtâ€™s conclusion about what conduct was reasonable to expect of the survivor of the abuse. In particular, the question of whether it was reasonable to expect that the survivor institute proceedings before he or she actually did so may often determine the extension application. To arrive at justifiable conclusions about this question, judicial reasoning needs to be adequately informed by psychological and psychiatric evidence about the effects of child sexual abuse on survivors in general, and the effects of the abuse in the particular applicantâ€™s case.
4. Contrast with other States
The new special limitation period for cases where a child is injured by a parent or a close associate of a parent suspends the running of time until the adult survivor of child abuse turns 25, and may effectively give many people in these cases until turning 37, provided that a plaintiff does not fail to bring proceedings within three years of actual discoverability. This gives plaintiffs in New South Wales and Victoria a far longer period of time in which to bring a civil action than is conferred by limitations statutes in the rest of Australia, which generally give plaintiffs until turning 21 to institute proceedings (save Western Australia and Tasmania), regardless of the knowledge they have about their case. If a plaintiff in one of these jurisdictions fails to commence proceedings within time, then in most but not all States, an extension of time is technically possible in some circumstances, and even if these circumstances are satisfied, the application for an extension may be denied, hence barring access to the courts.
The new provisions will benefit a significant number of plaintiffs in New South Wales and Victoria. Exactly how many people will benefit is impossible to predict, but by referring to recent statistics on substantiated cases of child abuse in various jurisdictions, we can see that there is a substantial number of people to whom these provisions will be directly relevant. The corollary of this is that the absence of similar amendments in other Australian jurisdictions will also assume significance, since a failure to enact similar provisions in these jurisdictions will create a situation where plaintiffs in some States will be enabled to bring civil proceedings under certain conditions, while plaintiffs in identical circumstances in other jurisdictions will be barred from access to civil courts. The statistics about the raw numbers of child sexual abuse substantiations do not inform us about the number of cases in these statistics where the wrongdoer was a parent or a close associate of a parent. However, two recent investigations into the relationship between victims and offenders demonstrate that the incidence of abuse by family members and other individuals who are known to the child (and who may therefore fall within the close associate definition) easily outnumber those cases where the wrongdoer is a stranger or is otherwise unlikely to qualify as a close associate.
4.1 Potential numerical significance of legislative changes: the incidence of child abuse
It is generally accepted that child abuse is an underreported phenomenon, but even the available statistics of its incidence suggest that these provisions have the potential to affect significant numbers of people throughout Australia. In New South Wales in 2002-03 there were 109,498 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 66,503 children. Of these, there were 16,765 substantiated cases involving 11,534 children. Of the 16,765 substantiations, 2427 were cases of sexual abuse. In Victoria in 2002-03 there were 37,635 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 28,421 children. Of these, there were 7287 substantiated cases involving 6846 children. Of the 7287 substantiations, 562 were cases of sexual abuse. In these two States in one year, then, there were 2989 child victims of sexual abuse.
Other jurisdictions have smaller numbers of reported substantiations due in part to their smaller populations. In Queensland in 2002-03 there were 31,068 notifications of child abuse and neglect to State authorities, involving 22,027 children. Of these, there were 12,203 substantiated cases involving 9032 children. Of the 12,203 substantiations, 610 were cases of sexual abuse. The numbers of substantiated cases of child abuse are even smaller in Western Australia (243), South Australia (180), Tasmania (61), the ACT (21) and the Northern Territory (33), but they are still significant. Altogether, in a twelve month period from 2002-03 throughout Australia, there were 198,355 notifications of child abuse and neglect, with 40,416 substantiated cases, containing 4137 substantiated notifications of child sexual abuse.
Individual wrongdoers are not the only possible future target of litigation. Queensland has a history of child sexual abuse in State and religious institutions and in State foster care. It is possible that the 2003 Commonwealth Senate Inquiry into children in institutional care will reveal similar records of institutional abuse, which could hold implications for State and institutional future liabilities. It is also possible that an inquiry in South Australia may have similar results. The statistics cited here about the incidence of child sexual abuse, and the evidence cited about the proportion of offenders who are family members of the victim or who are otherwise known to the child and who therefore may satisfy the close associate definition, demonstrate that there probably are not â€˜very fewâ€™ cases to which the special limitation period is potentially important, but a significant number. This remains so even when accepting that many instances of child abuse are never revealed, and that many survivors will either be unable to ever bring proceedings, or unwilling to do so even if accommodating legal provisions exist.
4.2 Reasons for substantial uniformity across jurisdictions
There are several reasons why there should not be disparities between limitation periods in child abuse cases within Australian jurisdictions. First, as a matter of justice, there should not be significant inequalities between jurisdictions in access to civil courts and compensation. There are no sound jurisdiction-specific reasons for having such differences, nor are there good theoretical reasons for having these differences. There is strong theoretical evidence underpinning the special limitation period, and this evidence has been acknowledged even by bodies charged with the contraction of the civil litigation system. In this context, for the fundamental purpose of seeking access to the court system, like cases should be treated similarly. This is a matter of equality in a liberal society which aspires to embody the rule of law. A child abuse victim in one State should not receive a significantly smaller temporal opportunity to access the civil courts than that granted to his or her counterparts in another Australian jurisdiction, provided that the longer period is justified. For the purpose of deciding how long a person should have to bring a civil claim for a defined class of action, citizens in the same country should be treated equally.
Second, since some families will live in a number of jurisdictions over time, and since child abuse often occurs over extended periods of time, especially when inflicted by a family member, jurisdictional disparities in limitation periods on the scale of these now existing will encourage forum shopping. A survivor of child abuse where the acts of abuse occurred in a number of jurisdictions could not be blamed for seeking civil compensation in the jurisdiction having a legal framework that was most likely to advance his or her case. This selection between jurisdictions will be likely to create technical legal problems and will add to the length, cost and complexity of trials.
Finally, related with the first two problems, the presence of inequalities that create disparate outcomes in matters of social justice constitutes especially strong evidence of an unjust legal system that adds to its disrepute with the public. Especially in contexts where legal provisions are created to offer relief to those who have been particularly mistreated, there is a need for largely consistent legal provisions to avoid this disrepute and loss of public confidence in the legal system.
The Ipp Report acknowledged the â€˜bewildering array of different limitation regimes in Australian jurisdictions.â€™ The amendments made in New South Wales and Victoria create more justifiable conditions for survivors of child abuse committed by certain classes of wrongdoers in those two jurisdictions. However, the bewildering array of legislative provisions in these types of cases has not been in any way diminished. The actions of these two legislatures in recognising the unjustifiability of short limitation periods in at least these types of child abuse cases creates more fragments in an already fractured legislative environment. Yet, the reform of those provisions serves to illuminate even more sharply the shortcomings of comparable provisions in other Australian jurisdictions.
* LLB (JCU), BA (Hons) (QUT), PhD (QUT); Lecturer in the School of Law, Queensland University of Technology. The author is grateful to Professor Harold Luntz for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 18A(2) and 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 36; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(1); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 5(1AA) and 27D(1)(a); Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 16B; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 12(1)(b).
 Limitation Act 1935 (WA) ss 38(1)(b) and s 38(1)(c)(vi) respectively. Since Wilson v Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 363 held that an action exists in both negligence and trespass for the acts constituting child sexual abuse, this can therefore bring different limitation periods into play in Western Australia.
 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence Report, Canberra, 2002 (Ipp Report), pp 90 ff ([6.18] ff).
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27D. In New South Wales, the new provisions apply to injuries sustained on or after 6 December 2002; in Victoria, the new provisions apply to injuries sustained on or after 21 May 2003.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50D; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27F.
 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) ss 5(2), 11, 29(2)(c); Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 45; Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) ss 2(2), 26(1); Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 40; Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) ss 8(3), 30; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) ss 4(1), 36.
 This has been the situation since enactment of the Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 26(6). The phrase â€˜breach of dutyâ€™ has been held by the Victorian Court of Appeal to include acts of intentional trespass: Mason v Mason  1 VR 325 at 330. This means that the exclusion of the suspension operates whether the action is brought in trespass or negligence.
 In Western Australia a survivor of child abuse will have until 22 or 24 depending on the cause of action relied on.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(2)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(1)(a). Compare the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87J(a), inserted by the Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth) as part of the new Part VIB, which implements the Ipp Reportâ€™s recommendations in relation to actions for personal injury damages suffered by contraventions of the Trade Practices Act. Contrast Tasmania, where a child in the custody of a parent is not deemed to be not under a disability: Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 2(2)(a).
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50F(3); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27J(3); and compare the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87G(4). This restores the provision originally enacted in Victoria by the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 23(1)(e). It is significant that because of the injustice caused by the 1958 provision, s 23(1)(e) was repealed by the Limitation of Actions (Personal Injury Claims) Act 1983 (Vic). The exclusion of the suspension in Tasmania in 1974 has not been repealed, nor has it been amended since the Ipp Report to provide for cases where the defendant is the childâ€™s parent or a close associate of the childâ€™s parent, or for cases where the childâ€™s parent does not bring an action on behalf of the child.
The Victorian and Tasmanian incursions into the suspension of time for infants in 1958 and 1974 respectively, and the revival of the incursion in Victoria and the adoption of it in New South Wales in 2002-03, replicate mid-twentieth century developments in the United Kingdom. Until those developments, for three centuries the limitation period for actions in trespass was suspended during minority because an infant could not bring a claim and no other person was compelled to bring a claim on his or her behalf. This suspension of time was embodied in the Limitation Act 1623, 21 Jac 1, c 16 s 7. The running of time was suspended for infants in other actions as well: see, for example, An Act for the Amendment of the Law and the Better Advancement of Justice 1705, 4 & 5 Anne, c 16 s 18. However, the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict, c 61 made an initial incursion into this general protection of infants by giving only six months to institute proceedings against persons acting in execution of statutory or public duties. The Limitation Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo 6, c 21 s 22(d) made the exclusion of the infancy extension against public authorities operate unless the injured child was not in the custody of a parent (this provision was duplicated in the New Zealand legislation: Limitation Act 1950 (NZ) s 24f). Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1939 (UK) otherwise embodied the 1623 provision, extending time from the date the disability ceased, which gave an injured minor six years from attaining majority to institute proceedings. A broader change occurred when the 1939 provision was expanded by the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz 2, c 36 s 2(2). This reform took the principle behind the â€˜custody of a parentâ€™ exclusion of the extension for cases against public authorities and applied it to all personal injury cases where a child was in the custody of a parent. However, this dramatic change was cancelled by the Limitation Act 1975 (UK) c 54 s 2. The Limitation Act 1980 (UK) c 58 s 28(1) now restates the 1623 principle, suspending the running of time until the cessation of disability, with s 38(2) providing that an infant is a person under a disability. New Zealandâ€™s duplication of the 1939 UK encroachment on the suspension of the running of time was also repealed in 1963: Limitation Amendment Act 1963 (NZ). For judicial remarks on the English developments, see Hewer v Bryant  1 QB 357 at 367-8 per Lord Denning MR, 370 per Sachs LJ; Todd v Davison  AC 392 at 402-3 per Viscount Dilhorne, 409-12 per Lord Pearson; Tolley v Morris  2 All ER 561; and McDonnell v Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees  1 All ER 641 at 644-9 per Lord Bingham.
Other Australian jurisdictions did not adopt Victoriaâ€™s 1958 strategy or Tasmaniaâ€™s 1974 enactment. In New South Wales, the position before 1969 essentially adopted the 1623 English legislation and the 1969 statute retained the suspension of time for infants. This was not changed until the 2002 amendments. In Queensland, the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 has not been changed in this respect and previous enactments retained the suspension of time for infants: Limitation Act 1960 (Qld) s 27; Limitation (Persons under Disabilities) Act 1962 s 2. In South Australia, the original 1936 provision which suspended time running during infancy (s 45) was preceded by another provision having the same effect: Limitation of Suits and Actions Act 1866 s 47. The 1936 provision has not been amended since. In Western Australia, the 1935 statute suspended time for infants until infancy ceased and this has not been amended since (although the public authorities exception in s 47A giving one year from the cause of actionâ€™s accrual to institute proceedings was inserted by the Limitation Act Amendment Act 1954 (WA)). In the Australian Capital Territory, the original Limitation Ordinance 1985, no 66 (Cth) s 30(1) suspended time running during infancy and this has not been amended. Similarly, the Northern Territory suspended time for infants in the 1981 statute and this has not been amended; the position before 1981 adopted the 1623 English position. Although being beyond the scope of this article, which is primarily concerned with the special limitation period, the recent exclusion of the suspension of time during infancy in Victoria and New South Wales, and the exclusion of the suspension of time in Tasmania, deserves assessment.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C(1)(a).
 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(a). Section 27D(2) makes it clear that the three-year post-discoverability limitation period that generally applies in personal injuries actions in Victoria under s 27D(1)(a) does not apply to actions where the injured person was under a disability, which includes being a child: s 3(2). Section 27E effectively creates a special limitation period for actions where the injured person is a child.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50C(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(b).
 Ipp Report, above n 1, at 95-96 [6.48-6.51].
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62D. There appear to be two demanding qualifications which must be met to enliven this extension. First, the parent must have irrationally failed to bring the action on the childâ€™s behalf. In the second reading of the amending legislation, it was remarked that the irrationality extension provision will be more difficult to meet than an extension based on unreasonableness: New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 19 November 2002 (Michael Egan, Treasurer, Minister of State Development and Vice-President of the Executive Council), at 6896ff. It is submitted that this extension provision should not be construed too severely; people should not suffer because of a parentâ€™s omission to bring proceedings on their behalf. Second, under s 62D(2)(a) it must appear to the court that the limitation period ended before the child turned 19. This may restrict the availability of this extension provision in cases where, for example, the seriousness of the injury did not become apparent before this date, or where the child was very young when the abuse occurred.
 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K.
 Ipp Report, above n 1, at ix.
 Ibid, at x.
 Ibid, at 96-97 [6.52-6.55].
 Ibid, at 88 [6.11].
 Ibid, at 96 [6.54].
 See for example Thomas J in W v Attorney-General  2 NZLR 709, at 729-30; Atkinson J in Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton  QCA 335 (Unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, McPherson JA and Muir J; Atkinson J dissenting, 24 August 2001) at ; see also the Canadian Supreme Court decision in M (K) v M (H)  3 SCR 6, and obiter dicta in the European Court of Human Rights decision in Stubbings v United Kingdom (1996) Eur Ct HR Applications 22083/93; 22095/93, at ; and B Mathews, â€˜Limitation periods and child sexual abuse cases: Law, psychology, time and justiceâ€™ (2003) 11(3) TLJ 218 at 230-241; A Marfording, â€˜Access to Justice for Survivors of Child Sexual Abuseâ€™ (1997) 5 TLJ 221; L Bunney, â€˜Limitation of Actions: Effect on Child Sexual Abuse Survivors in Queenslandâ€™ (1998) 18 Queensland Lawyer 128; and J Mosher, â€˜Challenging Limitation Periods: Civil Claims by Adult Survivors of Incestâ€™ (1994) 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 169 at 176-181.
 British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, the Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, Ontario, Saskatchewan and the Yukon have abolished time limits for civil actions based on sexual assault: Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266, s 3(4)(k)(i); Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L150, s 2.1(2)(a) and (b); Limitations Act, RSNL 1995, c L-16.1, s 8(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s 2.1(2); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNS 1989, c 258, s 2(5)(a) and (b); Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28, s 29 â€“ which adopts the Northwest Territories provisions; Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)-(3); Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act, RSY 2002, c 139, s 2(3).
In Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, the abolition of time limits extends to all actions for trespass to the person, assault or battery where at the time of the injury the person was in a relationship of financial, emotional, physical or other dependency with one of the parties who caused the injury: Limitation of Actions Act, CCSM 2002, c L150, s 2.1(2)(b)(ii); Limitation of Actions Act, RSNWT 1998, c L-8, s 2.1(1)-(2) (adopted in Nunavut: Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28, s 29); Limitations Act, RSO 2002, c 24, s 10(1)-(3); Limitation of Actions Act, RSS 1978, c L-15, s 3(1)(3.1)(b)(ii).
 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 551ff; Ipp Report, above n 1, at 85-6 [6.1-6.3].
 As happened in cases including Calder v Uzelac  VSCA 175 (Unreported, Victoria Court of Appeal, Buchanan and Chernov JJA and Ashley AJA, 14 November 2003); Applications 861 and 864 (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Botting DCJ, 21 June 2002); and Hopkins v State of Queensland  QDC 021 (Unreported, McGill DCJ, 24 February 2004).
 The reluctance to take legal action will often be linked with the survivor having post-traumatic stress disorder, one symptom of which involves the person avoiding stimuli associated with the traumatic events, including the thoughts and actions required to institute legal proceedings. For evidence about PTSD in survivors of child sexual abuse in both childhood and adulthood, see for example S McLeer, E Deblinger, M Atkins, E Foa and D Ralphe, â€˜Post-traumatic stress disorder in sexually abused childrenâ€™ (1988) 27 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; S McLeer, E Deblinger, D Henry and H Orvaschel, â€˜Sexually abused children at high risk for post-traumatic stress disorderâ€™ (1992) 31 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 875; P Ackerman, J Newton, W McPherson, J Jones and R Dykman, â€˜Prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychiatric diagnoses in three groups of abused children (sexual, physical, and both)â€™ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 759; S McLeer, J Dixon, D Henry et al, â€˜Psychopathology in non-clinically referred sexually abused childrenâ€™ (1998) 37 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1326; P Mullen, â€˜Impact of Sexual and Physical Abuse on Womenâ€™s Mental Healthâ€™ (1988) The Lancet 16 April; J Stein, J Golding, J Siegel, M Burnam and S Sorensen â€˜Long-term psychological sequelae of child sexual abuseâ€™ (1988) 27 Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 650; and P Mullen, â€˜Childhood Sexual Abuse and Mental Health in Adult Lifeâ€™ (1993) 163 British Journal of Psychiatry 721.
 Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service, Project AXIS â€“ Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: The Nature and Extent, 2000, Brisbane, at 88, citing K Bussey and E Grimbeek, â€˜Disclosure Processes: issues for child sexual abuse victimsâ€™, in K Rotenberg (Ed), Disclosure Processes in Children and Adolescents, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
 In Queensland, the Project Axis survey found that of 212 adult survivors of child sexual abuse, 25 took 5-9 years to disclose it, 33 took 10-19 years, and 51 took over 20 years: ibid, at 84 (Table 23).
 Where the perpetrator is a relative, it is even more likely that the delay in disclosure (much less the ability to commence civil proceedings) will be long. An analysis of Queensland Police Service data from 1994-1998 found that of 3721 reported offences committed by relatives, 25.5% of survivors took 1-5 years to report the acts; 9.7% took 5-10 years; 18.2% took 10-20 years, and 14.2% took more than 20 years: ibid, at 86 (Table 25). In contrast, of the 1058 cases where the offender was not known to the complainant, 27.4% reported the offence within a week, 34.4% reported it within 1-4 weeks, and a further 18.5% reported it within 1-6 months: ibid.
 For more detailed explanation, see Mathews, above n 22.
 Ipp Report, above n 1, at 96 [6.54].
 Ibid, at 96 [6.52].
 Ibid, at 97 [6.55].
 In New South Wales, to injuries sustained on or after 6 December 2002; and in Victoria, to injuries sustained on or after 21 May 2003.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(1)(a); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(1)(a); compare the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 87K(1).
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(1)(b); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(1)(b).
 Applications for extensions of time in personal injury cases including those involving child abuse are technically available in most but not all Australian jurisdictions, based on the claim that the plaintiff has only recently discovered material facts decisive to the case after expiry of the time period: Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 58, 60A, 60G, 62A and 62D; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 31; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48; Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) ss 23A and 27K; Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) s 36; Limitation Act 1981 (NT) s 44. However, even where an extension provision exists, an application can be defeated by judicial findings about the knowledge the applicant is perceived to have already possessed of his or her injuries, and by expectations about when it was reasonable for him or her to have instituted proceedings: see for example Hopkins, above n 25; Applications 861 and 864, above n 25; and Carter, above n 22; contrast Johnson v Director of Community Services (Vic)  Aust Torts Reports 81-540; McGuinness v Clark (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Duckett J, 7 May 2003); SD v Director-General of Community Welfare Services (Vic) (2001) 27 Fam LR 695; Woodhead v Elbourne  1 Qd R 220; and Tiernan v Tiernan (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byrne J, 22 April 1993).
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I(2): authorâ€™s emphasis. The comparable provision in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is s 87K(2).
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, above n 15, at 6896ff: â€˜There will be very few cases that fall within this important exception. In the main, this exception will be used when a child has been the victim of abuse.â€™
 Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370 at 384.
 See above n 38.
 As found in Carter, above n 22; Applications 861 and 864, above n 25; and Hopkins, above n 25.
 This is because the court retains discretion to refuse to extend time based on the prejudice to the defendant perceived to arise through the lapse of time: see for example Calder, above n 25; Carter, above n 22; and Applications 861 and 864, above n 25.
 Hopkins, above n 25
 The Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) s 5(3) does not enable an extension of time beyond six years from the date the cause of action accrued.
 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27E(2)(a).
 Bull, above n 41.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 51.
 In New South Wales, the victim may apply for an extension of the longstop under the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62A; in Victoria, the applicant can apply for an extension of time under the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K.
 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62A(2); Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K(2)(b).
 The provisions enabling this assessment of the personâ€™s conduct include the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 62B(1)(e) and (f); and Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27L(f) and (g).
 In Queensland, the Project Axis survey in 2000 of 104 survivors of child sexual abuse (which involved 211 offenders) found that 108 offenders (51.2%
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.Pedophilia and sexual abuse of children in Australia